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Abstract
I extend Myerson’s [R. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Math. Oper.
Res. 6 (1981) 58–73] ironing technique to more general objective functions.
The approach is based on a generalized notion of virtual surplus which can
be maximized pointwise even when the monotonicity constraint implied
by incentive compatibility binds. It is applicable to quasilinear principal-
agent models where the standard virtual surplus is weakly concave in
the allocation or appropriately separable in the allocation and type. No
assumptions on allocation rules are required beyond monotonicity.
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1 Introduction
In quasilinear principal-agent models where the agent’s type is one-dimensional
and her payoff function satisfies a single-crossing condition, optimal contracts
are found by maximizing expected virtual surplus subject to the constraint that
allocation be monotone in type (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole [4], or Salanie´
[13]). Formally, the problem is one of maximizing a real-valued functional∫ 1
0
J(φ(θ), θ)dF (θ)
over the set of nondecreasing functions φ : Θ → X mapping types to alloca-
tions. The standard approach to solving the problem when the monotonicity
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editor, and two referees for comments and discussions. Financial support from the Yrjo¨
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constraint binds—known as “ironing” because of the nature of the solution—is
to apply optimal control theory [4, 13]. In this paper I build on Myerson’s [10]
characterization of optimal auctions to develop an alternative method.
More specifically, I first observe that Myerson’s approach can be used in
problems where the function J is appropriately separable in its arguments. For
example, this class of problems includes the price discrimination model of Mussa
and Rosen [9] and the regulation model of Laffont and Tirole [7]. I then extend
the technique to problems where J is weakly concave in its first argument,
i.e., where the virtual surplus of each type exhibits weakly decreasing marginal
returns in the allocation. As discussed in Section 4, such concave problems
include the aforementioned examples of separable problems as well as many
models with interdependent values that generally fail separability.
Heuristically, the approach is based on a generalized notion of virtual sur-
plus that takes into account total surplus, the agent’s information rent, and
any distortions the current type causes to other types through the monotonicity
constraint. As standard virtual surplus accounts only for the first two, it fails
to capture the impact on the principal’s payoff of global incentive compatibility
constraints that correspond to the monotonicity constraint. The generalized
virtual surplus incorporates them through a convexification procedure due to
Myerson [10]. It amounts to averaging the marginal contributions of types
affected by the change in the allocation of the current type. In separable prob-
lems, such as in Myerson’s auction model, this can be done independently of
the allocation. I show that the idea can be extended to concave problems by
applying the procedure to each allocation. This yields the generalized virtual
surplus which can be simply maximized pointwise even when global incentive
compatibility constraints bind.
The results in this paper improve on the standard approach of using optimal
control in that no restrictions are placed on admissible allocation rules beyond
monotonicity. To see how such restrictions come about in the standard ap-
proach, I briefly review how the maximum principle is applied to the problem.1
The challenge there is how to incorporate the monotonicity constraint, which
can not be imposed on the control variable. The trick is to let the allocation
φ(θ) be the state and take its derivative φ′(θ) as the control. Monotonicity is
then simply the requirement that the control be non-negative. However, this
formulation is unsatisfactory as it assumes that the allocation rule φ—an en-
dogenous object—is absolutely continuous.2 For example, this assumption is
violated in auctions and other trading problems with linear utility, where op-
timal allocations are discontinuous. Furthermore, even in models where the
optimal allocation is differentiable, showing that non-differentiable rules offer
no improvement requires formulating the problem in a larger space where such
rules are feasible and which is no longer covered by standard results. In con-
trast, the approach in this paper allows for all monotone allocation rules and
1Jullien [6] provides a general exposition. For more on optimal control, see, e.g., Le´onard
and van Long [8], or the advanced treatment by Vinter [15].
2The state of the art in necessary conditions in the literature on optimal control requires
the state φ, also known as the arc, to be absolutely continuous—see Clarke [3].
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thus provides a unified treatment of problems with or without jumps in the
optimal allocation. It offers a possible way of assessing whether the properties
assumed in the standard approach hold in applications.
Contemporaneous work by Hellwig [5] also allows for jumps in the allocation
rule by extending the maximum principle to a class of problems with monotonic-
ity constraints while relaxing absolute continuity. He builds on the generalized
maximum principle of Clarke [2], which relies on non-smooth analysis. In con-
trast, the approach in the present paper is elementary and self-contained.
No¨ldeke and Samuelson [11] develop an approach to ironing without optimal
control, which is quite different from the present paper. Roughly put, they
work with the inverse of the allocation rule. The monotonicity constraint on
the inverse turns out to be non-binding more generally than the one on the
allocation rule. However, their approach requires virtual surplus to be strictly
concave in the allocation, which rules out jumps in the allocation rule. The
approach in this paper is more general for problems where the participation
constraint binds only at an extreme type, whereas No¨ldeke and Samuelson also
consider models where it may bind at intermediate types.3
I set up the problem in the next section. I then review Myerson’s approach
and observe that it applies to separable problems in Section 3. The readers
familiar with the technique can proceed directly to Section 4 where I present
the extension to concave problems, which is the main contribution of the paper.
An appendix collects the proofs omitted from the main text.
2 The problem
Let X := [0, x¯] and Θ := [0, 1]. Let J : X × Θ → R, and let F : Θ → [0, 1] be
a cdf with density f := F ′ > 0.4 Let M := {φ : Θ→ X | φ is nondecreasing}.
This paper is concerned with problems of the form5
sup
φ∈M
{∫ 1
0
J(φ(θ), θ)dF (θ)
}
. (P)
The leading example is the expected virtual surplus maximization problem
from single-agent mechanism design. With that in mind I use the following
terminology: x ∈ X is an allocation, θ ∈ Θ is a type, F is the principal’s
belief about θ, J is the virtual surplus function, and φ is an allocation rule. An
allocation rule is optimal if it attains the supremum in (P).
3The approach presented here can be used in the latter type of problems once the types
with binding participation constraints have been identified.
4It is straightforward to adapt the results to problems where X or Θ (or both) is discrete.
Details are available from the author upon request. Furthermore, it is without loss to take F
to be the uniform distribution. Namely, let F be a cdf on [θ, θ]. Let φ˜ := φ ◦ F−1 and let
J˜(x, ·) := J(x, F−1(·)) for all x ∈ X. A change of variables then gives ∫ θθ J(φ(θ), θ)dF (θ) =∫ 1
0 J(φ(F
−1(q)), F−1(q))dq =
∫ 1
0 J˜(φ˜(q), q)dq.
5For the problem to be well defined, the mapping J(φ(·), ·) : Θ → R has to be integrable
for any φ ∈ M. A sufficient conditions for this is that J : X × Θ → R is measurable and
bounded.
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In the canonical principal-agent model virtual surplus takes the form
J(x, θ) = v(x, θ) + u(x, θ)− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
u2(x, θ), (2.1)
where v and u are the principal’s and the agent’s payoff functions, and u2(x, θ)
denotes the partial derivative of u with respect to its second argument. However,
as the methods apply more broadly, I take J as the primitive and provide
sufficient conditions on u and v that deliver the required properties of J .
3 The separable case
It is instructive to start by reviewing the technique of Myerson [10]. I show that
it is applicable to problems that are separable in the following sense.
Definition 3.1. J : X×Θ→ R is separable if there exist functions a, b : X → R
and k, l : Θ→ R, where a is strictly increasing, such that for all (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ,
J(x, θ) = a(x)k(θ) + b(x) + l(θ). (3.1)
The problem (P) is separable if J is separable.
Example 3.2 (Mussa and Rosen [9], Myerson [10]). In the classic model of
monopolistic price discrimination by Mussa and Rosen [9] the virtual surplus
from consumer of type θ takes the form
J(x, θ) = x
(
θ − 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
− c(x),
where x is quality and c(x) is the cost of producing it. Taking c(x) = θ0x and
interpeting x as the probability of sale gives the virtual surplus in a single-agent
version of the optimal auction problem of Myerson [10].
Example 3.3 (Laffont and Tirole [7]). In a simplified version of the workhorse
model of regulation by Laffont and Tirole [7], a principal hires an agent to work
on a project that generates a benefit b at an observable cost c(e, θ) = θ − e.
Both the parameter θ and effort e are the agent’s private information. The
agent’s payoff is t−γ(e), where t is a transfer and γ(x) is the cost of effort; the
principal’s payoff is b− c(e, θ)− t. The virtual surplus is6
J(e, θ) = b− θ + e− γ(e)− F (θ)
f(θ)
γ′(e).
Letting x = −e this satisfies Definition 3.1 as long as γ′′ > 0.
6Take c to be the choice variable. Then payoffs are t− γ(θ− c) and b− c− t, so the virtual
surplus is b− c− γ(θ − c)− F (θ)
f(θ)
γ′(θ − c). Using c = θ − e we can write it in terms of effort.
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It can readily be verified that the canonical virtual surplus (2.1) is separable
if u is separable and values are private (i.e., v is independent of θ).
Let J be separable with k : Θ→ R as in Definition 3.1. For all q ∈ [0, 1], let
h(q) := k(F−1(q)), (3.2)
and
H(q) :=
∫ q
0
h(r)dr. (3.3)
Let convH be the convex hull of H on [0, 1] (see, e.g., Rockafellar [12]). Define
G := convH. (3.4)
Then G is the highest convex function on [0, 1] such that G ≤ H.7 Since G
is convex, it is continuously differentiable except possibly at countably many
points. Define g : [0, 1]→ R as follows. For all q ∈ (0, 1) such that G′(q) exists,
let
g(q) := G′(q), (3.5)
and extend g to all of [0, 1] by right-continuity. Finally, define k¯ : Θ→ R by
k¯(θ) := g(F (θ)). (3.6)
Note that k¯ is nondecreasing by construction.
Armed with the function k¯ defined above, define the generalized virtual sur-
plus
J¯(x, θ) := a(x)k¯(θ) + b(x) + l(θ), (3.7)
where a, b and l are as in Definition 3.1. The generalized virtual surplus J¯
differs from the virtual surplus J only in that k is replaced with k¯. Define the
maximizer correspondence Φ : Θ → P(X), where P(X) is the power set of X,
by
Φ(θ) :=
{
x ∈ X | J¯(x, θ) = sup
y∈X
J¯(y, θ)
}
. (3.8)
A function φ is a selection from Φ if φ(θ) ∈ Φ(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. By Topkis
[14], a monotone (i.e., nondecreasing) selection exists if Φ is nonempty-valued,
since the generalized virtual surplus J¯ has increasing differences in (x, θ) by
construction.
Remark 3.4. J = J¯ if and only if k is nondecreasing. (Then H is convex so
that H = G, h = g and k = k¯.) In that case the optimization problem in (3.8)
reduces to the standard practise of maximizing virtual surplus pointwise.
The effect of the monotonicity constraint is captured by the following con-
dition.
7I.e., convH(q) := min{λH(q1)+(1−λ)H(q2) | (λ, q1, q2) ∈ [0, 1]3 and λq1+(1−λ)q2 = q}.
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Definition 3.5. φ : Θ → X has the pooling property if for all open intervals
I ⊂ Θ,
G(F (θ)) < H(F (θ)) for all θ ∈ I =⇒ φ is constant on I.
Remark 3.6. Since F , G and H are continuous, the pooling property requires φ
to be constant on any set where G ◦ F and H ◦ F differ.
The following theorem is a minor generalization of the single-agent version
of Myerson’s [10] characterization of optimal auctions; the proof is presented in
the Supplementary material for completeness.8
Theorem 3.7 (Myerson [10]). Let J be separable and let φ ∈ M. Then φ
achieves the supremum in (P) if and only if φ has the pooling property and
φ(θ) ∈ Φ(θ) a.e.
This result identifies solutions to (P) with particular monotone selections
from Φ. It implies the standard ironing result: Outside pooling intervals J = J¯
so the solution there coincides with pointwise maximization of virtual surplus.
For the purposes of finding optimal allocation rules, the remarkable part
of Theorem 3.7 is given by two corollaries, which show that the transformed
problem can be solved by pointwise maximization even when the monotonicity
constraint binds.
Corollary 3.8. Let J be separable. Assume Φ(θ) is non-empty and compact
for all θ ∈ Θ, and let φ∗(θ) := max Φ(θ) and φ∗(θ) := min Φ(θ). Then the
selections φ∗ and φ∗ are monotone and achieve the supremum in (P).
Corollary 3.9. Let J be separable. Assume Φ is single-valued except at count-
ably many points. Then any selection from Φ attains the supremum in (P).
That is, the infinite-dimensional constrained maximization problem (P) is
equivalent to the family of independent one-dimensional optimization problems
in (3.8) in the sense that the highest and the lowest optimal allocation rule
can be found by maximizing the generalized virtual surplus pointwise (without
having to consider the pooling property or the monotonicity of the selection).
This is true of all optimal allocation rules unless there is a non-degenerate region
of types for which multiple allocations maximize the generalized virtual surplus.
4 The concave case
I assume in this section that J is defined and once continuously differentiable
on an open set containing X ×Θ. This implies that the integral in problem (P)
is well-defined for any φ ∈ M. In order to simplify notation, I normalize the
distribution F to be uniform.9
8Myerson only shows sufficiency, but necessity is straightforward—see Supplementary ma-
terial.
9As noted in footnote 4, this entails no loss of generality. Alternatively, the normalization
can be incorporated in the function h as in the separable case. Finally, if f is continuously
differentiable, then it can simply be included in J by redefining J˜(x, θ) := J(x, θ)f(θ).
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The results of this section require the virtual surplus J to be weakly concave
in the allocation x. Examples 3.2 and 3.3 satisfy this assumption provided that
the cost function c is weakly convex in Example 3.2 and we have γ′′′ ≥ 0 in
Example 3.3. The following is an example of a non-separable concave problem.
Example 4.1 (Mussa and Rosen [9] with interdependent values). Example 3.2
shows that the price discrimination model of Mussa and Rosen [9] leads to a
separable problem. If the seller’s cost depends directly on the buyer’s type (say,
because some types are more demanding and hence more costly to serve), then
the problem is in general no longer separable. The virtual surplus takes the form
J(x, θ) = x
(
θ − 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
− c(x, θ),
which is weakly concave in x as long as the cost function c is weakly convex in
x for each θ. A version of the model is solved in section 4.4.
More generally, the canonical virtual surplus (2.1) is not separable even
under private values if the agent’s utility function is not separable. It will
nevertheless be concave in x if the social surplus v(x, θ) + u(x, θ) is weakly
concave in x and the agent’s marginal utility u1(x, θ) is supermodular (i.e.,
u112 ≥ 0 so that changes in marginal utility when x varies are weakly greater
for higher types).
4.1 Definitions
I use essentially the same notation as in the separable case to highlight the anal-
ogy between the constructions. The main difference is that now convexification
has to be done allocation-by-allocation.
For all (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ, let
h(x, θ) := J1(x, θ), (4.1)
and let
H(x, θ) :=
∫ θ
0
h(x, r)dr. (4.2)
By assumption h is continuous (and hence integrable on {x} × [0, θ]) and thus
H(x, ·) is continuously differentiable on (0, 1) for any fixed x. For all x ∈ X, let
G(x, ·) := convH(x, ·). (4.3)
G(x, ·) is the highest convex function on [0, 1] such that G(x, ·) ≤ H(x, ·).10 As
the convex hull of a differentiable function, G(x, ·) is continuously differentiable
on (0, 1). Its derivative, denoted G2(x, θ), is nondecreasing in θ. For all θ ∈
(0, 1), let
g(x, θ) := G2(x, θ), (4.4)
10I.e., convH(x, θ) = min{λH(x, θ1) + (1 − λ)H(x, θ2) | λθ1 + (1 − λ)θ2 = θ, (λ, θ1, θ2) ∈
[0, 1]3}.
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and extend g(x, ·) to all of [0, 1] by continuity.
Define the generalized virtual surplus J¯ : X ×Θ→ R by11
J¯(x, θ) := J(0, θ) +
∫ x
0
g(s, θ)ds. (4.5)
Define the correspondence Ψ : Θ→ P(X) by
Ψ(θ) :=
{
x ∈ X | J¯(x, θ) = sup
y∈X
J¯(y, θ)
}
. (4.6)
Finally, let Γ := {φ : Θ→ X | φ is measurable}.
Remark 4.2. Suppose J has increasing differences (i.e., J1(x, θ) is increasing in
θ) so that maximizing virtual surplus pointwise gives a solution that is nonde-
creasing in θ. Then H(x, ·) is convex (because H2(x, θ) = J1(x, θ)). But then
H = G and h = g so that J = J¯ . Thus, under the standard sufficient conditions
for pointwise maximization the generalized virtual surplus reduces to the virtual
surplus.
Remark 4.3. If J is separable (but not necessarily concave), then the above
construction yields the same generalized virtual surplus (up to a constant) as
the one defined in (3.7) for the separable case (see the Supplementary material
for details). In this sense the above approach is a proper generalization of
Myerson’s.
4.2 The results
With the definitions in place, I am now ready to state the main results of the
paper, the proofs of which are in the next subsection.
Theorem 4.4 (Values). If J is weakly concave in x, then
sup
φ∈M
{∫ 1
0
J(φ(θ), θ)dθ
}
= sup
φ∈Γ
{∫ 1
0
J¯(φ(θ), θ)dθ
}
.
That is, in order to find the maximized expected value of the virtual surplus
function over all nondecreasing allocation rules in (P), it suffices to maximize
the expected generalized virtual surplus over all (measurable) allocation rules.
The latter can be done pointwise. Indeed, by definition any selection from Ψ
attains the supremum on the right-hand side.
In terms of economics, Theorem 4.4 shows that if the agent’s utility function
in the canonical principal-agent model has the single-crossing property, then the
generalized virtual surplus captures all implications of incentive compatibility
on the principal’s problem. In this sense it generalizes the standard notion of
virtual surplus which only accounts for local incentive compatibility constraints.
11I show below that the function g(·, θ) is continuous for all fixed θ. It is thus bounded on
the compact set [0, x] and hence integrable.
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It turns out that while any solution to (P) is (almost everywhere equal to) a
monotone selection from Ψ, there may be monotone selections form Ψ that are
not solutions to (P).12 However, the smallest and largest optimal allocation rule
can be obtained by maximizing the generalized virtual surplus independently
for each type. In order to state this result, define for all θ ∈ Θ
φ∗(θ) := max Ψ(θ) and φ∗(θ) := min Ψ(θ). (4.7)
Theorem 4.5 (Maximizers). Let J be weakly concave in x. Then φ∗ and φ∗
are monotone and attain the supremum in (P). Furthermore, if φ ∈M attains
the supremum in (P), then φ∗(θ) ≤ φ(θ) ≤ φ∗(θ) and φ(θ) ∈ Ψ(θ) a.e.
Note that this result also establishes the existence of a maximizer in problem
(P). If Ψ is single-valued except at countably many points, then all selections
are monotone and agree with φ∗ a.e. This gives the following analog of Corollary
3.9.
Corollary 4.6. Let J be weakly concave in x. Assume Ψ is single-valued except
at countably many points. Then any selection from Ψ attains the supremum in
(P).
Remark 4.7. The supplementary material contains an example showing that
in general weak concavity of J in x cannot be dropped from the assumptions
in Theorems 4.4 and 4.5. This is because the construction here considers only
small changes in the allocation as it builds upon the derivative J1(x, θ). Under
concavity this is sufficient as then local optimality implies global optimality.13
Remark 4.8. Since J¯ is weakly concave in x, the extremal selections satisfy
φ∗(θ) = max {x ∈ X | g(x, θ) ≥ 0} and φ∗(θ) = min {x ∈ X | g(x, θ) ≤ 0} ,
where max ∅ = 0 and min ∅ = x¯.
Subsection 4.4 contains a fully solved example. While obtaining closed-form
solutions can be tedious, the results can be used to derive comparative statics
and other properties of the maximizers to problem (P). I illustrate this with two
applications: I first argue that strict concavity of J in x is a sufficient condition
for the maximizer to be unique and hence continuous. I then show that the
solutions have the familiar ironing property.
12Maximizers can be characterized by a pooling property as in the separable case. A function
φ ∈M has the generalized pooling property (gpp) if for all x ∈ X and all open intervals I ⊂ Θ,
φ−1(x) ∈ I and G(x, θ) < H(x, θ) for all θ ∈ I =⇒ φ is constant on I,
where φ−1 is the generalized inverse defined in (4.8). It can be shown that if J is weakly
concave in x, then φ ∈M attains the supremum in (P) if and only if φ has gpp and φ(θ) ∈ Ψ(θ)
a.e. Checking gpp is in general quite complicated. Furthermore, unlike in the separable case,
the result does not immediately characterize optimal pooling intervals since the intervals
depend on the allocation rule φ. For these reasons I do not pursue this direction further.
13Quasi- or pseudo-concavity does not suffice as the construction here involves taking inte-
grals and the sum of two quasiconcave functions need not be quasiconcave.
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Suppose J is strictly concave in x. The argument in the proof of Lemma
4.11 can be adapted to show that then J¯ is also strictly concave in x. Hence
(4.6) is single-valued and thus continuous by the Maximum theorem. Thus there
is a unique, continuous optimal allocation rule. The general point illustrated
here is that it can be relatively easy to show that the convexification procedure
preserves certain properties of J which then translate to properties of solutions.
In order to show the ironing result, note first that if J is weakly concave and
continuously differentiable in x, so is J¯ (see Lemmas 4.10 and 4.11 below). Thus
first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient when maximizing J¯(x, θ). For
simplicity, suppose that for each θ there exists a unique interior allocation φ(θ)
that maximizes the generalized virtual surplus J¯(x, θ). If φ(θ) does not also
maximize the virtual surplus J(x, θ), then by weak concavity of J in x we have
J1(φ(θ), θ) = h(φ(θ), θ) 6= 0 = g(φ(θ), θ) = J¯1(φ(θ), θ).
But then H(φ(θ), ·) and G(φ(θ), ·) differ in some open neighborhood I of θ.
Thus g(φ(θ), ·) is flat on I so that g(φ(θ), τ) = 0 for all τ ∈ I. Since we have
assumed a unique maximum for each type, this implies that φ(θ) is assigned to
all types in I. That is, if the allocation φ(θ) does not maximize virtual surplus
from type θ, then θ belongs to a pooling interval. Outside these intervals the
solution coincides with pointwise maximization of virtual surplus.
4.3 Proofs
I first establish three technical lemmas, the first two of which do not require
concavity. Their proofs are somewhat tedious but not particularly illuminating,
and hence relegated to the Appendix.
Lemma 4.9. The function g defined in (4.4) is continuous in x.
Lemma 4.10. The generalized virtual surplus J¯ defined in (4.5) is continuous,
continuously differentiable in x, and has increasing differences in (x, θ).
Lemma 4.11. If the virtual surplus J is weakly concave in x, then the gener-
alized virtual surplus J¯ is weakly concave in x.
Given the properties of J¯ established in Lemma 4.10, Berge’s Maximum
theorem [1] implies that the correspondence Ψ defined by (4.6) is upper hemi-
continuous, nonempty, and compact-valued. As J¯ has increasing differences,
the selections φ∗ and φ∗ defined in (4.7) exist and are nondecreasing.
It is convenient to introduce two more pieces of notation. For all φ ∈ M,
define the generalized inverse φ−1 : X → Θ by
φ−1(x) := inf {θ ∈ Θ : φ(θ) ≥ x} , (4.8)
where inf ∅ = 1 by convention. Denote the difference between the expected
virtual surplus and the expected generalized virtual surplus from allocation rule
φ ∈M by
∆(φ) :=
∫ 1
0
(
J(φ(θ), θ)− J¯(φ(θ), θ)) dθ.
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Since J(x, θ) = J¯(x, θ) +
(
J(x, θ)− J¯(x, θ)), the objective in (P) can be written
as ∫ 1
0
J(φ(θ), θ)dθ =
∫ 1
0
J¯(φ(θ), θ)dθ + ∆(φ).
The following two lemmas about ∆(φ) are the key to the proof.
Lemma 4.12. supφ∈M∆(φ) = 0.
Proof. For all φ ∈M we have
∆(φ) =
∫ 1
0
(
J(φ(θ), θ)− J¯(φ(θ), θ)) dθ
=
∫ 1
0
[
J(0, θ) +
∫ φ(θ)
0
h(s, θ)ds−
(
J(0, θ) +
∫ φ(θ)
0
g(s, θ)ds
)]
dθ
=
∫ 1
0
∫ φ(θ)
0
(h(s, θ)− g(s, θ)) dsdθ
=
∫ x¯
0
∫ 1
φ−1(x)
(h(x, θ)− g(x, θ)) dθdx
=
∫ x¯
0
(
G(x, φ−1(x))−H(x, φ−1(x))) dx ≤ 0,
(4.9)
where the last equality follows since G(x, 1) = H(x, 1) for all x ∈ X. The
inequality is by definition of G. The constant function φ ≡ 0 achieves the
bound.
Lemma 4.13. If J is weakly concave in x, then ∆(φ∗) = ∆(φ∗) = 0.
Given any φ ∈M, let
Aφ :=
{
x ∈ (0, x¯) | G(x, φ−1(x))−H(x, φ−1(x)) < 0} .
Inspecting the last line in (4.9) it is seen that in order to prove Lemma 4.13 it
suffices to show that Aφ∗ and Aφ∗ have at most countably many elements. In
showing this I use the following observation.
Claim. Let φ be a monotone selection from Ψ and let x ∈ Aφ. Then there
exists an open neighborhood U of θx := φ
−1(x) such that x ∈ Ψ(θ) for all θ ∈ U .
Proof of the Claim. Fix a monotone selection φ and x ∈ Aφ. Since φ is mono-
tone, we have limθ↑θx φ(θ) ≤ x ≤ limθ↓θx φ(θ). Upper hemi-continuity of Ψ then
implies limθ↑θx φ(θ) ∈ Ψ(θx) and limθ↓θx φ(θ) ∈ Ψ(θx). But J¯(·, θx) is concave
by Lemma 4.11 and hence Ψ(θx) is convex. Thus x ∈ Ψ(θx). Since x is interior
and J¯(·, θx) is continuously differentiable in x by Lemma 4.10, we have the first
order condition
J¯1(x, θx) = g(x, θx) = 0.
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As G(x, ·) and H(x, ·) are continuous, G(x, θx)−H(x, θx) < 0 implies that there
is an open neighborhood U of θx such that G(x, ·)−H(x, ·) < 0 on U , and hence
g(x, ·) is constant on U . Combined with the above first order condition this gives
J¯1(x, θ) = g(x, θ) = g(x, θx) = 0 for all θ ∈ U.
Since J¯ is concave in x, this implies that x ∈ Ψ(θ) for all θ ∈ U .
Proof of Lemma 4.13. Let x ∈ Aφ∗ . By the above Claim, there exists an open
neighborhood U of θx := φ
−1
∗ (x) such that x ∈ Ψ(θ) for all θ ∈ U . Thus
φ∗(θ) = min Ψ(θ) ≤ x for all θ ∈ U . But by definition of the inverse, φ∗(θ) ≥ x
for all θ > θx. Thus φ∗(θ) = x for all θ ∈ U such that θ > θx. But then x is
a point of discontinuity of φ−1∗ . Since φ
−1
∗ is monotone, there can be at most
countably many such points. Hence Aφ∗ has at most countably many elements.
Let y ∈ Aφ∗ . Again there is an open neighborhood V of θy such that y ∈ Ψ(θ)
for all θ ∈ V . Thus φ∗(θ) = max Ψ(θ) ≥ y for all θ ∈ V . But the definition
of the inverse implies φ∗(θ) < y for all θ < θy, a contradiction. Thus Aφ∗ is
empty.
We are now ready to complete the proofs of the theorems.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Since M⊂ Γ, we have
sup
φ∈Γ
{∫ 1
0
J¯(φ(θ), θ)dθ
}
≥ sup
φ∈M
{∫ 1
0
J¯(φ(θ), θ)dθ
}
≥ sup
φ∈M
{∫ 1
0
J¯(φ(θ), θ)dθ + ∆(φ)
}
= sup
φ∈M
{∫ 1
0
J(φ(θ), θ)dθ
}
,
where the second line is by Lemma 4.12 and the last by definition of ∆(φ).
In the other direction, if J is weakly concave in x, we have
sup
φ∈M
{∫ 1
0
J(φ(θ), θ)dθ
}
≥
∫ 1
0
J(φ∗(θ), θ)dθ
=
∫ 1
0
J¯(φ∗(θ), θ)dθ = sup
φ∈Γ
{∫ 1
0
J¯(φ(θ), θ)dθ
}
,
where the second line is by Lemma 4.13 and the definition of φ∗.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. By inspection of the proof of Theorem 4.4, φ∗ attains
the supremum in (P). The same argument shows that φ∗ attains the supremum
in (P).
Assume then that φ ∈ M attains the supremum in (P). Since ∆(φ) ≤ 0 by
Lemma 4.12, we have∫ 1
0
J¯(φ(θ), θ)dθ ≥
∫ 1
0
J(φ(θ), θ)dθ = sup
γ∈M
{∫ 1
0
J(γ(θ), θ)dθ
}
.
Thus φ(θ) ∈ Ψ(θ) a.e. by Theorem 4.4. The inequalities follow by (4.7).
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4.4 An example
I conclude by presenting an example of a concave (but non-separable) problem
where the optimal allocation rule is discontinuous and hence it can not be solved
using the standard optimal control approach. Nevertheless, the virtual surplus
is weakly concave in the allocation and the technique developed in this paper
applies.
Consider a model of monopolistic price discrimination with interdependent
values as in Example 4.1. The buyer’s valuation is given by u(x, θ) = x(θ2 + 16 ),
and the seller’s cost is given by
c(x, θ) =
{
0 if x < 1,
1
2 (θ + 1)(x− 1)2 if x ≥ 1.
That is, the seller’s marginal cost is constant (and normalized to zero) for the
first unit, and it is increasing thereafter. The type θ is distributed uniformly
on the unit interval. The set of feasible allocations is X = R+. Virtual surplus
takes the form
J(x, θ) =
{
x(θ2 + 16 )− (1− θ)2xθ if x < 1,
x(θ2 + 16 )− (1− θ)2xθ − 12 (θ + 1)(x− 1)2 if x ≥ 1
= (3θ2 − 2θ + 1
6
)x− 1
2
(θ + 1)(x− 1)21{x≥1}.
This specification captures a situation where higher types of the buyer have
a higher marginal willingness to pay for the good or service, but at the same
time are more expensive to serve than the lower types. One can think of x as
the quality of a restaurant meal or of some other service, where the customers
who are willing to pay the most for given quality are also the most demanding
and require the most attention from the staff. Because of these countervailing
effects, ironing is needed: Maximizing virtual surplus pointwise suggests the
allocation rule
φˆ(θ) =
{
3θ2−θ+ 76
θ+1 if θ ∈ [0, 2−
√
2
6 ] ∪ [ 2+
√
2
6 , 1],
0 if θ ∈ ( 2−
√
2
6 ,
2+
√
2
6 ).
In a sense then, the middle types are the worst. The highest types, while being
the most expensive to serve, have a high enough marginal willingness to pay to
be attractive to the seller. Similarly, the lowest types are attractive despite their
low willingness to pay since serving them is inexpensive. Note that because of
the initially constant marginal cost, φˆ is discontinuous.
In order to apply Theorems 4.4 and 4.5, we use the definitions in (4.1)–(4.5)
to construct the generalized virtual surplus. We have
h(x, θ) =
{
3θ2 − 2θ + 16 if x < 1,
3θ2 − (x+ 1)θ − x+ 76 if x ≥ 1,
13
and
H(x, θ) =
{
θ3 − θ2 + 16θ if x < 1,
θ3 − x+12 θ2 − (x− 76 )θ if x ≥ 1.
Note that, for x small enough, H(x, ·) is initially concave and then convex. This
makes convexifying simple as it suffices to “iron out” the initial concave part.
Straightforward calculations give the convex hulls
G(x, θ) =
{
− 112θ if θ < 12 ,
θ3 − θ2 + 16θ if θ ≥ 12 ,
for all x < 1,
and
G(x, θ) =
{
(−x216 − 98x+ 5348 )θ if θ < x+14 ,
θ3 − x+12 θ2 − (x− 76 )θ if θ ≥ x+14 ,
for all x ≥ 1.
Thus we have
g(x, θ) =
{
− 112 if θ < 12 ,
3θ2 − 2θ + 16 if θ ≥ 12 ,
for all x < 1, (4.10)
and
g(x, θ) =
{
−x216 − 98x+ 5348 if θ < x+14 ,
3θ2 − (x+ 1)θ − x+ 76 if θ ≥ x+14 .
for all x ≥ 1. (4.11)
Recall from Remark 4.8 that the maximal optimal allocation rule is given
by
φ∗(θ) = max {x ∈ X | g(x, θ) ≥ 0} ,
where max ∅ = 0. Since g is weakly decreasing x, we immediately see from
(4.10) that φ∗(θ) = 0 for all θ < 2−
√
2
6 . We may then note that the first case in
(4.11) is negative. Hence the optimal allocation for θ ≥ 2−
√
2
6 can be solved for
from the second case in (4.11). Thus we have
φ∗(θ) =
{
0 if θ ∈ [0, 2+
√
2
6 ),
3θ2−θ+ 76
θ+1 if θ ∈ [ 2+
√
2
6 , 1].
That is, the lowest types are excluded, then there is a jump from 0 to 1 at
2+
√
2
6 after which the solution coincides with pointwise maximization of standard
virtual surplus.
Appendix: Proofs of the technical lemmas
Proof of Lemma 4.9. The claim is established by showing successively that all
the functions defined in (4.1)–(4.4) are continuous (in x).
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By definition h = J1 is continuous, since J is assumed once continuously
differentiable on an open set containing X ×Θ.
For continuity of H, fix (x, θ) ∈ X × Θ. For any sequence converging to
(x, θ),
lim
n→∞H(xn, θn) = limn→∞
∫ 1
0
h(xn, r)1{r≤θn}dr =
∫ 1
0
h(x, r)1{r≤θ}dr = H(x, θ),
where the second equality follows by Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem
since
∣∣h(xn, r)1{r≤θn}∣∣ ≤ sup(x,θ)∈X×Θ |h(x, θ)| <∞ for all (xn, θn, r) ∈ X×Θ2
by continuity of h and compactness of its domain, and since for a.e. r ∈ Θ, we
have limn→∞ h(xn, r)1{r≤θn} = h(x, r)1{r≤θ} by continuity of h. Thus H is
continuous.
I then show that G is continuous in x. By definition,
−G(x, θ) = max{−λH(x, θ1)− (1− λ)H(x, θ2) :
(λ, θ1, θ2) ∈ [0, 1]3 and λθ1 + (1− λ)θ2 = θ}.
Holding θ ∈ Θ fixed, the objective function in the above maximization problem
is continuous in (λ, θ1, θ2, x) and the feasible set is compact and independent of
x. Thus G is continuous in x by the Maximum theorem.
Consider then g. It is convenient to extend G to X × D, where D ⊂ R is
an open set containing [0, 1] = Θ. Since G(·, θ) is continuous for all θ ∈ Θ, and
G(x, ·) is continuously differentiable on (0, 1) and convex on [0, 1] for all x ∈ X,
the extension can be chosen such that G(·, θ) is continuous for all θ ∈ D, and
G(x, ·) is continuously differentiable and convex on D for all x.14 We then have
g(x, θ) = G2(x, θ) for all (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ.
Fix θ ∈ [0, 1]. Let x ∈ X and let (xn) be a sequence in X such that xn → x.
We have
lim sup
xn→x
g(xn, θ) = lim sup
xn→x
lim
t↓0
G(xn, θ + t)−G(xn, θ)
t
= lim sup
xn→x
inf
t>0
G(xn, θ + t)−G(xn, θ)
t
≤ lim sup
xn→x
G(xn, θ + s)−G(xn, θ)
s
∀s > 0 : θ + s ∈ D
=
G(x, θ + s)−G(x, θ)
s
∀s > 0 : θ + s ∈ D,
where the first equality is by definition of g, the second by convexity of G in θ,
and the last by continuity of G in x. Therefore,
lim sup
xn→x
g(xn, θ) ≤ lim
s↓0
G(x, θ + s)−G(x, θ)
s
= g(x, θ).
14For example, for all x ∈ X, let G(x, ·) be affine on D\[0, 1] with G2(x, θ) = limτ↓0G2(x, τ)
for all θ < 0 and G2(x, θ) = limτ↑0G2(x, τ) for all θ > 1, where the affine parts are chosen
such that G(x, ·) is continuous on D. By construction, G(x, ·) so extended is convex and
continuously differentiable. Continuity of G(·, θ) for all θ ∈ D\[0, 1] follows from the continuity
of G(·, 0) and G(·, 1), since, e.g., |g(x, θ)− g(y, θ)| = |g(x, 0)− g(y, 0)| for all θ < 0 and all
(x, y) ∈ X2.
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An analogous argument gives
lim inf
xn→x
g(xn, θ) ≥ G(x, θ)−G(x, θ − s)
s
∀s > 0 : θ − s ∈ D,
which implies
lim inf
xn→x
g(xn, θ) ≥ lim
s↓0
G(x, θ)−G(x, θ − s)
s
= g(x, θ).
Thus limxn→x g(xn, θ) = g(x, θ) so that g(·, θ) is continuous at x. Since x and
θ were arbitrary, the claim follows.
Proof of Lemma 4.10. For any fixed θ, the function J¯ is an integral function in
x, and the integrand g(·, θ) is continuous by Lemma 4.9. Hence J¯ is continuously
differentiable in x for all θ ∈ Θ.
For continuity, fix (x, θ) ∈ X × Θ and consider a sequence in X × Θ such
that (xn, θn) → (x, θ). Note that g is nondecreasing and continuous in θ by
construction, and it is continuous in x by Lemma 4.9. Hence for all (s, θn) ∈
X ×Θ,
−∞ < inf
y∈X
g(y, 0) ≤ g(s, θn) ≤ sup
z∈X
g(z, 1) <∞.
We thus have
lim
n→∞ J¯(xn, θn) = limn→∞ J(0, θn) + limn→∞
∫ x¯
0
g(s, θn)1{s≤xn}ds
= J(0, θ) +
∫ x¯
0
g(s, θ)1{s≤x}ds = J¯(x, θ),
where the second equality is by continuity of J and the Lebesgue’s dominated
convergence theorem as
∣∣g(s, θn)1{s≤xn}∣∣ ≤ max {|infy∈X g(y, 0)| , |supz∈X g(z, 1)|}
for all (s, xn, θn) ∈ X2×Θ, and since for a.e. s ∈ X, limn→∞ g(s, θn)1{s≤xn} =
g(s, θ)1{s≤x} by continuity of g(s, ·). Thus J¯ is continuous.
To show increasing differences in (x, θ), take any (x, x′) ∈ X2 and (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ2
such that x′ ≥ x and θ′ ≥ θ. Then
J¯(x′, θ′)− J¯(x, θ′) =
∫ x′
x
g(s, θ′)ds ≥
∫ x′
x
g(s, θ)ds = J¯(x′, θ)− J¯(x, θ),
where the inequality follows from g being nondecreasing in θ.
Proof of Lemma 4.11. The generalized virtual surplus J¯ is differentiable in x
by Lemma 4.10. Recalling the definition from (4.5) we have J¯1(x, θ) = g(x, θ).
So it suffices to show that g is nonincreasing in x for any fixed θ ∈ Θ.
To this end, note first that h(x, θ) = J1(x, θ) is nonincreasing in x for any
θ ∈ Θ by the weak concavity of J in x. By (4.2) we have for all x′ > x and
θ′ > θ,
H(x′, θ′)−H(x′, θ) =
∫ θ′
θ
h(x′, r)dr ≤
∫ θ′
θ
h(x, r)dr = H(x, θ′)−H(x, θ).
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That is, H has increasing differences in (−x, θ).
Suppose then to the contrary of g being nonincreasing in x that there exists
(x, x′, θo) ∈ X2 × Θ such that x′ > x and g(x′, θo) > g(x, θo). Since g(x′, ·)
and g(x, ·) are continuous, it is without loss to assume that θo is interior. Let
L : [0, 1] → R be the unique affine function tangent to G(x, ·) at θo. Similarly,
let L′ : [0, 1] → R be the affine function tangent to G(x′, ·) at θo. Denote
ρ := G(x, θo)−G(x′, θo).
Claim 1. ∃θ ≤ θo : H(x, θ)−H(x′, θ) ≥ ρ.
Proof of Claim 1. By definition G(x, ·) is convex and lies everywhere below
H(x, ·) so that
H(x, θ) ≥ G(x, θ) ≥ L(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
If H(x′, θo) = G(x′, θo), we are done since then the first of the above inequalities
(evaluated at θo) implies H(x, θo)−H(x′, θo) ≥ G(x, θo)−G(x′, θo) = ρ. Other-
wise H(x′, θo) > G(x′, θo). But then G(x′, ·) is affine and coincides with L′ in a
neighborhood of θo. Moreover, the point (θo, G(x
′, θo)) is a convex combination
of two points from the graph of H(x′, ·) so that there exists θ1 < θo such that
H(x′, θ1) = L′(θ1). By construction ddθ (L(θ)− L′(θ)) = g(x, θo)− g(x′, θo) < 0.
This together with the second of the above inequalities implies H(x, θ1) −
H(x′, θ1) ≥ L(θ1)− L′(θ1) > L(θo)− L′(θo) = G(x, θo)−G(x′, θo) = ρ.
Claim 2. ∃θ > θo : H(x, θ)−H(x′, θ) < ρ.
Proof of Claim 2. Assume first thatH(x, θo) = G(x, θo). The differenceH(x, θ)−
L′(θ) is a continuously differentiable function of θ with H(x, θo) − L′(θo) =
G(x, θo) − G(x′, θo) = ρ. Moreover, ddθ (H(x, θ)− L′(θ)) |θ=θo= g(x, θo) −
g(x′, θo) < 0 so that there exists θ2 > θo such that ρ > H(x, θ2) − L′(θ2) ≥
H(x, θ2)−H(x′, θ2) as we wanted to show.
Assume then that H(x, θo) > G(x, θo). Then G(x, ·) coincides with L in a
neighborhood of θo and there exists θ3 > θo such that H(x, θ3) = L(θ3). But
then H(x, θ3)−H(x′, θ3) ≤ L(θ3)− L′(θ3) < L(θo)− L′(θo) = ρ.
We have arrived at the desired contradiction since Claims 1 and 2 are incompat-
ible with H having increasing differences in (−x, θ). Hence g is nonincreasing
in x implying that J¯ is weakly concave in x.
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